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OF SNEETCHES AND SNAKES: RACE AND
REDISTRICTING AFTER SHAW v. RENO
I.

INTRODUCTION

"We know who is who! Now there isn't a doubt.
The best kind of Sneetches are Sneetches without!"
Then, of course, those with stars all got frightfully mad.
To be wearing a star now was frightfully bad.
Then, of course, old Sylvester McMonkey McBean
Invited them into his Star-Off Machine.
Then, of course from THEN on, as you probably guess,
Things really got into a horrible mess. 1
Dr. Seuss' tale The Sneetches2 creates a humorous illustration of the problems created by discrimination based on
appearance. In his story, Dr. Seuss describes how the StarBelly Sneetches do not allow the Plain-Belly Sneetches to
participate in their beach activities. One day Sylvester
McMonkey McBean appears with a machine that can add or
subtract stars from the bellies of the Sneetches. In a race to
be the superior group, the Sneetches keep paying Sylvester to
add and subtract stars. Ultimately, there is such a confusion
over whether Star-Belly Sneetches or Plain-Belly Sneetches
are superior, they decide Sneetches are Sneetches regardless
of the stars.
Although the message of The Sneetches seems clear
enough, prejudice continues to be a "horrible mess" in Ameri3
can society, as well as in its political and legal systems. The
issue of differential treatment due to race has a long history
of litigation under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 As a part of Equal Protection jurispru1. DR. SEUSS [THEODOR S.
OTHER STORIES 18-19 (1961).

GEISEL], The Sneetches, in THE

SNEETCHES AND

2. Id.

3. See

ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE

TION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 1-10 (1987).

Ac-

4. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Race: The Most Divisive Issue, N.J. L.J., August
23, 1993, at 10. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the United States, nor
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dence, the "group" of rights and remedies associated with voting rights has had a distinct history, particularly after the
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.1 With voting rights
litigation becoming increasingly common in the last two decades, several lawsuits have been filed challenging reapportionment plans that intentionally create "majority-minority
7
voting districts" 6 under the Voting Rights Act.
One of the most publicized recent battlegrounds over reapportionment on the basis of race took place in North Carolina, where the Twelfth District for the United States House
of Representatives [hereinafter "District 12"] was challenged
by five white voters on the basis that the district constituted
an unconstitutional "gerrymander."8 Popularly known as the
"1-85 District,"9 Justice O'Connor described District 12 as a
160 mile long "snake" no wider at points than one lane of
highway 1-85.10 The district is long enough to be served by
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right if He had
Said: "When it Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only
Thing"?, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1237, 1244 (1993) [hereinafter Grofinan, Vince
Lombardi]. See Appendix 2 for relevant sections of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1993) [hereinafter Voting Rights Act].
6. Majority-minority voting districts are defined as "districts in which a
majority of the population is a member of a specific minority group." Voinovich
v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1153 (1993). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
requires that such districts be created wherever possible. Id.
7. Bernard Grofman attributes some of the increasing litigation to antivoting rights backlash, based in part on partisan (mainly conservative) concern
as well as the increasingly convoluted shapes of districts, including the twelfth
district of North Carolina. Grofman, Vince Lombardi, supra note 5, at 1247-49
(citing, inter alia, Abigail Thernstrom, "Voting Rights" Trap, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 1985, at 21).
8. "Gerrymander" is defined as "to divide (a territorial unit) into election
districts to give one political party an electoral majority in a large number of
districts while concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as possible." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 515 (1986).
The term "gerrymander" was coined to describe a district formed by Governor
Elbridge Gerry's creation of a "salamander" shaped district in 1812 to protect
his party's interests. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (1986).
9. David G. Savage, High Court Rules Against Racial Gerrymandering,
L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at Al.
10. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2820-21 (1993) (citing Shaw v. Barr, 808
F. Supp. 461, 476-77 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd and remanded sub nom., Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)). See Appendix 1 for a reproduction of the North Carolina Congressional Plan, illustrating the shape of District 12.
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three national airports and three television markets.11 North
Carolina State Representative Mickey Michaux commented,
"if you drove down the interstate with both car doors open,
you'd kill most of the people in the district." 12 This "bizarre"
district was created by the North Carolina legislature in an
attempt to create a 13black voting district under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act.

In Shaw v. Reno, 4 the Supreme Court recognized for the
first time that voters have standing to challenge a voting district based on its appearance under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 A violation exists if
legislation creating a voting district, though race-neutral on
its face, "rationally cannot be understood as anything other
than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the
basis of race."' 6 To appreciate the impact of the Court's recognition of the Equal Protection claim based on district appearance in Shaw, it is first necessary to trace the legislative
and judicial treatment the role of race in voting rights cases,
with a special focus on how race has been applied to the process of redistricting.
The procedural history of Shaw, leading up to its acceptance for review by the Supreme Court, is traced in order to
outline plaintiff's attacks on District 12.17 This comment
proceeds to analyze the manner in which the holding of Shaw
affects the rights of voters by allowing discrimination claims
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 The analysis focuses on the role of race and geo11. Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11102, at
*272 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 1994) (Voorhees, J., dissenting).
12. Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting;White Voters Challenge Black-Majority Map, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4. Interestingly, this quote was originally used to describe a Texas district which was
drawn to protect an incumbent after the 1970 Census. T. Alexander Aleinikoff
& Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 616.
13. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits jurisdictions subject
to the section from creating changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting" without the approval of the Attorney General or United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1993).
See Appendix 2 for the complete text of § 5.
14. 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).
15. Id. at 2832.
16. Id. at 2828.
17. See discussion infra part II.
18. See discussion infra part III.A.
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graphic appearance in redistricting as articulated in Shaw. 19
It evaluates alternate ideals and approaches to districting,
concluding that a consistent standard for compactness is central to implementing the mandates of Shaw.20 This comment
next analyzes the approaches taken by courts to redistricting
cases subsequent to the Shaw decision 2 1 and suggests that a
quantitative standard for compactness is a solution which
can harmonize Shaw's Fourteenth Amendment concerns as
well as the compactness requirements of the Voting Rights
Act. 2 2

II.

BACKGROUND

When the Star-Belly Sneetches had frankfurter roasts
Or picnics or parties or marshmallow toasts,
They never invited the Plain-Belly Sneetches.
They left them out in the cold, in the dark of the beaches.
They kept them away. Never let them come near.23
And that's how they treated them year after year.
The role of race in redistricting has been evident since
blacks obtained the right to vote. 24 The process of redistricting came to the forefront of racial issues by the passage of the
what has been
Voting Rights Act of 1965,25 ushering in
2 6 Shaw v. Reno 27
revolution."
"reapportionment
termed the
illustrates the conflict between two important legal constraints on redistricting.28 Consequently, this section focuses
on voting rights in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the roles of the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting
Rights Act on redistricting. It then describes the central voting rights cases which led up to the Supreme Court's decision
in Shaw. Finally, this section analyzes the holding in Shaw
and the rationales that the Court employed in recognizing a
19. See discussion infra part III.B.
20. See discussion infra part IV.A-C.
21. See discussion infra part IV.D.
22. See discussion infra part V.
23. DR. SEUSS, supra note 1, at 7.
24. See THERNSTROM supra note 3. See also discussion infra part II.B.1 and
accompanying notes.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1993).
26. Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting
Rights Trilogy, 1993 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 246.
27. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
28. See discussion infra part II.D.
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new cause of action, based on district appearance, under the
Equal Protection Clause.
A.

The Special Role of Voting Rights

Redistricting in order to obtain partisan advantage is not
a new concept. Patrick Henry attempted to redraw the lines
of James Madison's congressional district in Virginia to prevent Madison's election to Congress.2 9 Shaw's 160-mile
"snake" of 1993 is certainly part of the heritage of protecting
party interests, first evidenced by Governor Gerry's "salamander" district of 1812.30 However, several factors make
District 12 significantly more difficult to deal with. 31 Shaw
contains the added ingredient of race. It also comes after
legal restraints have been added to the redistricting proa special status
cess.32 Most importantly, voting rights have
34
33
as a cornerstone of a democratic society.

Baker v. Carr

recognized voting rights as a constitutional concern in 1962.
While voting rights cases continue to draw on Equal Protection analysis, much of the litigation has focused on the role of
race. Such cases are additionally subject to the provisions of
the Voting Rights Act.35 Indeed, Shaw addresses a point of
conflict between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting
Rights Act. 36 The next section traces the development of this
conflict.

29. Henry attempted to prevent Madison's election by redrawing district
lines because of Madison's presumed opposition to the adoption of the Bill of

Rights. FrankR. Parker, Racial Gerrymanderingand Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORTY VOTa DILUTION 85, 85 (Chandler Davidson, ed., 1984).
30. See supra note 7.
31. See Grofman, Vince Lombardi, supra note 5, at 1244.
32. See infra part II.B.2-3 for a discussion of the Voting Rights Act. Cf
Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1932) (discussing Congressional repeal of federal contiguity and compactness requirements for voting districts).
33. "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice
in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we
must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
34. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing one-man one-vote principle).
35. See Grofman, Vince Lombardi, supra note 5, at 1244-45.
36. See discussion infra part II.C. See also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 143 (1986) (plurality opinion) (recognizing a cause of action under the
Equal Protection Clause for an unconstitutional political gerrymander).
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PervasiveDiscrimination:The Equal Protection Clause
and the Voting Rights Act
1.

The Civil War Amendments

The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
of the Constitution were passed after the Civil War with the
specific intention of guaranteeing equal rights to black citizens.3 7 The Fifteenth Amendment provides, "[t]he right of
the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude."3 8 Despite the
intent of the Civil War Amendments, southern states used a
variety of methods such as "grandfather clauses" 39 and "good
character" requirements 40 to circumvent the enfranchisement of black citizens. A slightly more subtle, but equally
persistent form of discrimination, "racial gerrymanders,"
redrew political lines in order to minimize the effect of the
black vote.4 1 One of the earliest examples of this phenomena,
was the "shoestring" district created in Mississippi in 1877
which packed most black voters into one of six districts, running the length of the Mississippi River.4 2 The ongoing nature of this problem was reflected in the landmark decision of
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,43 in which the Supreme Court struck
down an attempt by the city of Tuskegee to change its municipal boundaries so that nearly all of the city's 400 black voters, but none of the white voters, were eliminated.4 4
37. J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the FirstReconstruction, in MiNORITY VOTE DILUTION 27, 28 (Chandler Davidson, ed., 1984).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.

39. Grandfather clauses were enacted to prevent blacks from voting by denying the right to vote to any descendent of persons who had not been allowed
to vote prior to the Civil War. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)
(striking down an Oklahoma grandfather clause which denied the right to vote
to descendants of slaves).
40. Don Edwards, The Voting Rights Act of 1965, As Amended, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 1, 5 (Lorn Foster, ed., 1985).
41. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 (1986) (quoting Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring)). A "racial gerrymander" is defined as "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries
and populations for partisan or personal political purposes." Id.
42. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877, at 590 (1988). Gerrymanders were used extensively in the period
after Reconstruction to minimize black voting strength. Id.
43. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
44. Id. at 341, 347-48.
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The Voting Rights Act

In 1965, ninety-five years after the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress determined that discrimination in voting was an "insidious and pervasive evil which has
been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution."4 5 In
response to ongoing attempts to prevent blacks from exercising the right to vote in the South, Congress passed the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 with the express purpose of allowing
blacks a real chance to vote. 46 Two central provisions of the
Act are sections 2 and 5. Section 2 outlaws any procedure
which denies or abridges the right to vote. 4 7 In terms of voting, section 2 prohibits any state or subdivision from denying
minorities the opportunity to "participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."48 Section 5
requires pre-clearance 4 9 by the U.S. Attorney General or
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
before any proposed changes to voting procedures are made
within that state. 50
From the outset, the Voting Rights Act played an instrumental role in eliminating "first generation" obstacles to minority voting such as literacy tests, grandfather clauses, poll
taxes, and other voter registration barriers commonly known
as "Jim Crow" laws. 5 1 For example, the Act was highly successful in drawing black voters to the polls, with nearly a 900
45. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
46. Edwards, supra note 40, at 5.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988).
48. Id. § 1973(b). Section 2 applies nation-wide. Id.
49. "Preclearance" refers to the requirement that a state or subdivision
which is subject to this section must submit any change to the U.S. Attorney
General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for
approval before implementation. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1993). See Appendix 2
for text of § 5.
50. Section 5 pre-clearance applies only to specific districts which have a
history of depressed political participation by minorities. Any jurisdiction
which falls under § 5 must obtain either a judgment from the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia or pre-clearance from the Attorney
General that the change in voting procedure "does not have the purpose and
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1993). Forty of North Carolina's one hundred
counties are subject to § 5 pre-clearance, therefore making any redistricting effort subject to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act. Karlan, supra note 26, at
272 n.111.
51. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 621. See also Lani Guinier,
The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Elec-
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percent increase in the number of blacks registered to vote in
southern states.52 These blatant forms of discrimination,
however, were more easily overcome than less direct forms of
discrimination, or "second generation" barriers, such as reapportionment, which were challenged in the 1960's.53
The Supreme Court's first major recognition that the
guarantee of equal access to voting polls would be insufficient
to guarantee equal voting rights occurred in Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections. 4 Allen focused on minority groups and the
fact that voting power is based on the right of minorities to
elect candidates of that group's choice. 55 When such groups
are denied voting power as a bloc through practices such as
at-large voting districts,56 the voting power of that group is
"diluted."57 Stated differently, "the Equal Protection Clause
is violated only when an election structure 'affects the political strength' of a racial group by unduly diminishing its influence on the political process."5 8 As the Court discussed in
White v. Regester,59 any districting scheme which has the
purpose and effect of diluting minority voting power is discriminatory, and therefore unconstitutional. 60 This standard
toral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093-101 (1991) [hereinafter, Guinier,
The Triumph of Tokenism].
52. Edwards, supra note 40, at 5.
53. Id. at iv. See also Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 51, at
1093-101.
54. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
55. Id. at 569.
56. In an at-large voting district, all voters within a geographical area (e.g.,
a city) vote for a number of candidates who will fill all of the elective positions.
Single-member districts, in contrast, elect a single representative for a certain
geographical area. Minority candidates can be consistently denied any representation in such a system. See Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution:An
Overview, in MINORTY VOTE DILUTION 1, 4-7 (Chandler Davidson, ed., 1984).
57. Chandler Davidson defines dilution as "a process whereby election laws
or practices, either singly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting
among an identifiable group to diminish the voting strength of at least one
other group." Id. at 4. Richard L. Engstrom defines dilution as "the practice of
limiting the ability of [minorities] to convert their voting strength into the control of, or at least influence with, elected public officials." Richard L. Engstrom,
Racial Vote Dilution: The Concept and the Court, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT:
CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 63 (Lorn S. Foster ed., 1985).
58. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "BizarreDistricts," and Voting Rights: EvaluatingElection-DistrictAppearancesAfter Shaw
v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 493 (1993) (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
59. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
60. Id. at 765-66.
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"dovetailed" with the constitutional standards of the Equal
Protection Clause until the Voting Rights Act was amended
in 1982.61

3. The 1982 Amendments
The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act greatly
increased the scope of the Act. The expanded section 2 encompasses nearly every racial challenge to redistricting and
supplants the constitutional basis for a claim with a statutory
basis. 62 The requirement that a plaintiff prove only the effect
of minority vote dilution in order to make out a discrimination claim is the most important change to the Act in terms of
redistricting.63 The effects of this change are twofold. First,
plaintiffs in voting rights cases can now seek relief under section 2 because there is a lower standard of proof of discrimination than the constitutional standard, which requires a
showing of intent.6 4 Second, the lower standard of proof required by section 2 encourages partisan groups to use a vote
dilution claim under the Voting Rights Act to seek more
favorable districting lines.65
Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act, as written into the
1982 amendments, mandates a "totality of the circumstances" approach for determining whether there is equal
participation in the political process and election of representatives. 66 The seminal case interpreting the "totality" requirement of section 2 is Thornburg v. Gingles,67 which sets
forth a three-part test to determine whether a redistricting
scheme is valid under the Voting Rights Act. Gingles holds
that plaintiffs who bring a suit under section 2 must prove
first that a minority community is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district."s8 The minority must also demonstrate common
voting preferences so as to be considered "politically cohesive."69 Finally, a plaintiff must prove that the majority is
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Karlan, supra note 26, at 250.
Grofman, Vince Lombardi, supra note 5, at 1238-39.
Engstrom, supra note 57, at 36.
Karlan, supra note 26, at 251.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Id. at 49.
Id. at 51.
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engaged in "racially polarized" voting behavior in which the
candidate of the majority bloc usually defeats the preferred
candidate of the minority community.7 ° If each of the three
prongs is met, the "totality of the circumstances" establishes
that the minority vote has been diluted, and has resulted in
unequal access to the electoral process. 71 Once such a violation has been established, the Voting Rights Act requires that
the government or agency which created the district institute
a new voting system which allows for effective minority
representation.7 2
The Supreme Court created the Gingles criteria to describe the circumstances in which there is minority vote dilu73 It has
tion in multi-member or at-large voting schemes.
evolved, however, as a bright-line rule that avoids the "totality of the circumstances" rule in section 2(b) of the Voting
Rights Act.7 4 While Gingles may be applied to challenges
75
against single-member voting districts, the remedy provided by Gingles does not fit as neatly in single-member districts as multi-member or at-large districts because it is more
difficult to establish a minority group that is "sufficiently
76
large and geographically compact." This problem of establishing a community in which to create a new minority district has, generally, led courts to give no substantive meaning
77
to the compactness requirement as articulated in Gingles.
70. Id. at 55-56. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, PolarizedVoting and the
PoliticalProcess:The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,90 MICH.
L. REV. 1833 (1992).
71. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 487 n.17.
72. Id. at 487. Professor Karlan characterizes the Gingles test as one of
causation, in which the central question is whether the current system denies
minority voters "a fair opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice, and is
there an alternative system which would provide that opportunity?" Karlan,
supra note 26, at 262.
73. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See supra note 56.
74. Karlan, supra note 26, at 262.
75. The Supreme Court only recently held that the Gingles criteria apply to
Voting Rights Act challenges against single-member districts. Growe v.
Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993).
76. Subsequent to the Gingles case, plaintiffs sought to divide multi-member districts into single-member districts. Problems concerning application of
this remedy to single-member districts have been recognized in pending litigation. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 488-89.
77. The Supreme Court has implied that districting bodies, as well as
courts, were not giving any weight to the compactness requirement in Growe v.
Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993). Justice Scalia questioned the compactness of
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of compactness is precisely what
This lack of any real notion
78
Shaw.
in
led to the claim
C.

The Path to the Supreme Court

Until the redistricting brought forth by the 1990 Census,
North Carolina had not elected a black representative to the
United States Congress since the Reconstruction Era, despite
its twenty percent black voting population. 79 The black population remains, however, relatively dispersed, with blacks
constituting a majority in only five of North Carolina's 100
counties.8 ° As a result of its history of discrimination in voting rights, North Carolina is required to submit any change
in its voting practices or structures to the Attorney General
or United States District Court for the District of Columbia
8
for pre-clearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. "
As a result of the 1990 Census, North Carolina was entitled
to an additional Congressional district, therefore requiring a
change in the voting structure of the state. Because a new
district would be created, the redistricting effort required
more than "tinkering" with district lines. The additional elements of strong partisan and racial interests complicated the
General Assembly's attempts to carve out a
North Carolina
8 2
new district.
North Carolina's first attempt to redistrict included one
majority-black district which was created with the dual intentions of compliance with the Voting Rights Act and protec3
tion of the Democratic incumbents in neighboring districts."
The Attorney General refused to clear the districting scheme,
based on both the failure of the state to create a second maMinnesota's Senate District 59, which linked minority populations in the northern and southern parts of Minneapolis. Id. at 1083-85.
78. See discussion infra part II.D. On remand, Judge Voorhees' dissent
noted that District 12 ignores the geographical compactness requirement.
Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11102, at *234
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 1994) (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting in part).
79. Whites make up 78% of the voting age population with the remaining
2% consisting of primarily Native Americans and Asians. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993).
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
82. Karlan, supra note 26, at 272-73. The General Assembly of North Carolina controls redistricting, with no veto provision for the Governor. Additionally, both houses were controlled by the Democratic party. Pope v. Blue, 809 F.
Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court), aff'd, 113 S.Ct. 30 (1992).
83. Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 394.
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jority-black district and concern with incumbent protection! 4
Although the Attorney General had listed the southeastern
part of North Carolina as a potential area for a second, reasonably compact black-majority district,8 5 North Carolina decided against this option in order to protect the incumbents in
that area of the state.8 6 Instead of challenging the finding of
the Attorney General in federal court, North Carolina created
Congressional District 12, which was subsequently precleared. 7 District 12 has a voting-age population which is
53.34% black, and 45.21% white.8 8
The new District 12 was challenged almost immediately.
The first case to arrive in court was Pope v. Blue, 9 brought by
Republican voters and others as a political gerrymandering
case. The plaintiffs claimed that District 12 was unconstitutional because it diluted their political influence. 90 Under
Davis v. Bandemer,91 a political group may bring a vote dilution claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Bandemer
held that any election rule that serves no other purpose than
to favor one group interest, be it racial, ethnic, economic, religious, or political, is justiciable. 92 The district court in Pope,
relying principally on Bandemer'slanguage that "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is
arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's
or group of voters' influence on the political process as 94a
whole," 93 dismissed the case for failure to state a claim.
The holding in Pope is not surprising since Justice O'Connor
84. Id.
85. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993).
86. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 479 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd and remanded sub noma., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
87. The "1-85" District is 160 miles long and meanders through parts often
counties. It is no wider than a single point in some places. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at
2820-21. See Appendix 1 for a reproduction of District 12.
88. Appendix to State Appellees' Brief, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993)
(No. 92-357).
89. 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court), aff'd, 113 S. Ct.
30 (1992).
90. The plaintiffs in this case were the North Carolina Republican Party,
thirty Republicans, nine Democrats, and three independent voters. Id. at 394.
91. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion).
92. Id. at 143. See also, Alexander Athan Yanos, Reconciling the Right to
Vote with the Voting Rights Act, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1810, 1820 (1992).
93. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132.
94. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 399 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court),
aff'd, 113 S.Ct. 30 (1992).
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noted that "[vote dilution analysis is far less manageable
when extended to major political parties than if confined to
racial minority groups. " 95 The Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's finding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim because exclusion of Republicans in redistricting does
96
not equal exclusion from the political process as a whole. In
retrospect, the key point of Shaw is that a successful claim
97
requires race as an element in a constitutional challenge.
At the same time Pope was in the court system, five
plaintiffs sued the federal and state officials who had redis98
tricted North Carolina. This case, Shaw v. Barr, challenged
District 12 as well as the constitutionality of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. Two of the plaintiffs, Ruth Shaw and Melvin Shimm, were in somewhat the same position as the black
voters in the Gomillion case.9 9 They effectively had been
"fenced out" of a district with a majority of white voters, and
placed in the 12th District which was specifically drawn to
1
create a black majority. 10 0 The plaintiffs in Shaw v. Barr"
alleged that the creation of a district which was "in no way
related to considerations of compactness, [sic] contiguousness, and geographic or jurisdictional communities of inter10 2
They further
est" violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
of the
members
electing
for
process
a
in
"participate
to
sought
apof
which
color-blind,"
[is]
House of Representatives which
10 3
The district court rejected this arportionment was a part.
gument, relying on the holding in United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey (UJO).10 4 As its central analysis,
UJO adopted the language of section 2, holding that redis95. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 156 (1986) (O'Connor, J. concurring).
96. Pope, 809 F. Supp. at 392.
97. See discussion infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
98. 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd and remanded sub nom., 113 S.
Ct. 2816 (1993).
99. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 633 n.180.
100. Id. See supra notes 43-44.
101. 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd and remandedsub. nom., Shaw
v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
102. Id. at 465-66.
103. Brief for Federal Appellees, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No.

92-357).
104. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). UJO involved the division of a Hasidic Jewish
community of 30,000 people in Brooklyn. The purpose of the division was to
create districts with nonwhite majorities as required by the Department of Justice. Members of the Jewish community filed suit on a vote dilution claim. Id.
at 152-53.
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tricting violates the voting rights of white voters under the
Voting Rights Act and Equal Protection Clause if the district
05
has the purpose and effect of discriminating against them.1
In its analysis of the Barr claim, the district court found no
legislative intent to deprive white voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the political process. 10 6 The plaintiffs
likewise could not allege discriminatory effect since there was
no cognizable injury or general dilution of white voting
strength. The district court therefore granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. 0 The Supreme Court granted review limited to one issue:
Argument shall be limited to the following question,
which all parties are directed to brief: "Whether a state
legislature's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act
and the Attorney General's interpretation thereof precludes a finding that the legislature's congressional redistricting plan was adopted with invidious discriminatory
intent where the legislature did not accede to the plan
suggested08by the Attorney General but instead developed
its own.1
D. Why Does Appearance Matter? The Shaw Holding
"If more specific guidelines to minimize gerrymandering
are not forthcoming, then a great democratic principle-one
man, one vote-will have degenerated into a simplistic arithmetical facade for discriminatory cartography on an extensive scale."' 09 James Baker, who expressed this concern in
1973, appears to have foreseen the problem which the
Supreme Court decided to address in Shaw twenty years
later. The holding of Shaw recognizes a new, analytically distinct cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 0 Any reapportionment plan
which "though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be
105. Id. at 165-68.
106. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 473 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd and remanded sub noma., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
107. Id.

108. Shaw v. Barr, 113 S. Ct. 653,probablejurisdictionnoted and remanded,
808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd and remanded sub nom., Shaw v. Reno,
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
109. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 751 n.8 (1983) (Stevens, J., concur-

ring) (citing James Baker, Quantitative and Descriptive Guidelines to Minimize
Gerrymandering,219 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci. 200, 208 (1973)).
110. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993).
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understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race," is unconstitutional unless it has sufficient justification."'
The Court based its holding on the premise that reappor12
tionment is an "area in which appearances do matter."'
The rationale behind this proposition is that, in the search for
a color-blind society, voters can be injured by a political system which reinforces racial stereotypes by intentionally
drawing districts in which blacks (or other minorities) are a
majority. 1 1 3 In drawing parallels to other areas of law in
which racial stereotypes are unacceptable, the Court justified
Shaw by expressing its desire to prevent the perception that
a racial group will have the same political views simply because of race-without giving weight to such factors as age,
14
Justice
education, economic status, or community.'
O'Connor explained:
reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of
representative democracy by signaling to elected officials
racial group rather than
that they represent a particular
1 5
their constituency as a whole.
However, the Court did not stop there. It argued that a district based on race alone, without considerations of geographical or political boundaries, "bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid."

1

6

This singular reliance on

race as the basis for districting led the Supreme Court to demand strict scrutiny of such line-drawing under the Equal
Protection Clause. The opinion, remanded to the District
Court, therefore left open questions regarding justification for
Shaw's holding.

III. ANALYSis
"Belly stars are no longer in style," said McBean.
"What you need is a trip through my Star-Off Machine.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2827.

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993).
116. Id. at 2827.
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This wondrous contraption will take off your stars
So you won't look like Sneetches who have them on
thars."117
McBean's Star-Off Machine wiped the stars off the StarBelly Sneetches so that the Plain-Belly Sneetches could not
tell the difference. In this way, the Plain-Bellies could not
keep the Star-Bellies from participating in beach games.
While Shaw does not purport to act as a "Star-Off Machine"
that will make the districting process fair to all races, the
question remains whether it will recognize appropriate limits
to gerrymandering while permitting minorities full participation in redistricting. This section examines the central concerns that Shaw addresses, and the role that race will play in
redistricting cases subsequent to Shaw.
A.

The Application of Shaw
1.

Strict Scrutiny

The Supreme Court has held that "state legislation that
expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race
. . [must] be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest" in order to comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 1 Shaw recognizes the appearance of a district
as a threshold issue in establishing a constitutional claim, as
opposed to an ultimate issue that in and of itself makes a certain district unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, therefore,
remanded the case for the District Court to determine
whether District 12 was narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. 1 9 Once strict scrutiny has been
triggered by a district with a bizarre shape, the districting
*

117. DR. SEuss, supra note 1, at 17.
118. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993) (citing Wygant v. Jackson

Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) (plurality opinion)). Both race, as a
suspect classification, and the right to vote, as a fundamental right, trigger
strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. Where strict scrutiny is invoked, a classification will be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest.
119. Id. at 2832. On remand, the district court expressed its opinion that the

Supreme Court would not "adopt a definition of'narrow tailoring' in the redistricting context that requires consideration of whether the challenged plan
deviates from traditional notions of compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political subdivisions to a greater degree than is necessary to accomplish the
state's compelling purpose." Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11102, at *123 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 1994). See discussion infra notes
250-57 and accompanying text.
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body bears the burden of proving that it has a compelling in120 The justiterest in drawing the lines in the manner it has.
fication of "bizarrely" drawn districts must therefore pass
"the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that
classify citizens by race."1 2 1 In order to meet the familiar
"ends-means" test of the Equal Protection Clause, "the odd
shape of a district must result from a state's pursuit of aims
that are legitimate and constitutionally compelling. Second,
the means the state chooses must be narrowly122tailored to
achieving those legitimate aims and no others."
Shaw failed to articulate the ends which would be sufficient to justify districts drawn under circumstances similar to
District 12.123 Traditional districting ends, such as naturally
irregular political boundary lines, geographic features (i.e.,
coastlines, mountains), and communities of interest are probably sufficient ends.' 2 4 A related question is whether race itself can ever be considered a sufficiently legitimate end to justify drawing oddly-shaped districts in order to establish a
community of interest. 1 25 Shaw seems to imply a limit on
what may be considered a legitimate interest. It is unlikely
that partisan interests and incumbency protection would satof a compelling interest under a strict
isfy the requirement
1 2
scrutiny analysis. 1
2.

The Limits of the Shaw Holding

In order to place Shaw in proper perspective, it is helpful
to recognize the types of claims the case did not address.
Although Shaw was analyzed as an Equal Protection claim, it
is wholly distinct from a vote dilution claim, such as that
120. Karlan, supra note 26, at 282 n.166.
121. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993).
122. Professors Pildes and Niemi believe these justification questions are as
important as questions of appearance. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 575.
123. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
124. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 576-77.
125. Id. Cf. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
126. The Shaw holding specifically rests on the analysis of race as a concern
addressed by the Equal Protection Clause. "Its central purpose is to prevent
the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of
race." Shaw v Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993)(citing Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)). See also Vera v. Richards, C.A. No. H-94-0277, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12368, at *99 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 1994).
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presented in UJO. 127 Secondly, while Shaw recognized a
claim based on the shape of a voting district, it is important
to recognize that the shape of the district alone did not create
a constitutional claim. 128 It is only the creation of a "bizarrely" shaped district in conjunction with the express in129
tent to benefit race that creates a constitutional concern.
The Court also distinguished Shaw from purely political districting as presented in Davis.13 0 Again, the racial component in Shaw subjected District 12 to strict scrutiny. Finally,
Shaw did not prohibit all types of race-conscious districting,
though it did not endorse them either.1 3 1 The above limitations of Shaw, therefore, have led scholars to interpret the
decision in a limited context, as opposed to an "opening volley" which will lead to the invalidation of race-conscious
32
districting. 1
3.

Standing and Injury Concerns

Shaw has been criticized by commentators as showing a
"complete disregard" for the standing requirement of Article
III of the Constitution. 1 3 3 This criticism rests on the argument that the plaintiffs did not show any individual injury in
3
fact, the traditional requirement to establish standing.1 1
Justice Souter, in his dissent, argued that vote dilution
claims have been the only judicially-cognizable type of injury
recognized in voting rights cases under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and should remain so.' 3 5 In the context of voting rights and Equal Protection analysis, Shaw did not include a claim of vote dilution.
127. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 602. See supra part II.C for
discussion of vote dilution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
128. The Court expressly states that the Constitution does not generally require that districts be compact or contiguous. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826-27.
129. Id. at 2825.
130. See supra at part II.C. Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens argued
that Shaw should be functionally equivalent to gerrymanders for non-racial
purposes. Id. at 2844 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 2835-36 (White, J.,
dissenting).
131. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993).
132. Pildes and Niemi read Shaw as "an exceptional doctrine to form aberrational contexts" rather than as a prelude to a sweeping constitutional condemnation of race-conscious redistricting. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 495.
See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
133. Karlan, supra note 26, at 278.
134. Id.
135. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2845-46 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Just as Shaw recognized a completely separate cause of
action, the majority concluded that standing must be based
136 The decision labeled the inon a different theory of injury.
1 3 7 The plaintiffs
jury to plaintiffs as one of "special harms."
described the injury as prevention of the right to participate
in a color-blind electoral process, a harm that potentially any
13 8 With the theoretical
voter could bring as a cause of action.
underpinning to a concern with color-blind politics, Shaw can
be viewed as recognizing a concern with the "values of polit1 39
Therefore, when race domiical integrity and legitimacy."
the creation of voting disin
concern
other
nates over any
principles of
constitutional
tricts, the district violates
political integrity. The Shaw opinion supports this interpretation by expressing its concern regarding districts drawn
with the purpose of creating minority districts in which
elected officials "are more likely to believe that their primary
obligation is to represent only the members of that group,
1 40
Recognizing
rather than their constituency as a whole.
it reredistricting,
in
factor
sole
the
be
not
may
that race
play.
may
it
role
the
exactly
mains to be determined
B.

The Role of Race in Redistricting
1. ConstitutionalNature of the Problem

Professors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi argue that
Shaw addresses a particular type of constitutional problem,
which they describe as a corruption of a decisionmaking process.' 4 1 The constitutional problem is created when "policymakers have transformed a decision process that ought to involve multiple values-as a matter of constitutional law136. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 515 n.115. For a discussion of standing based on individualized injury, in the context of legislative apportionment,
see Craig R. Gottleib, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitutional and PrudentialConcerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1078-81 (1994).
137. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993).
138. Id. at 2824.
139. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 502.
140. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
141. Pildes and Niemi classify three types of problems "through which constitutional law can appraise government action." They identify two basic
modes: those that focus on the illegitimacy of legislative purpose; and those
that focus on effect of policy decisions on people's (or groups') rights. The Shaw
problem, arguably a third mode of constitutional analysis, focuses on what is
labeled as a "problem of value reductionism in public policy." Pildes & Niemi,
supra note 58, at 500.
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and reduced it to a one-dimensional problem."142 The Shaw
opinion should therefore be viewed not as a condemnation of
the use of race as a consideration in redistricting, but rather
as a recognition that race cannot completely supersede traditional criteria in districting.143 The fact that a district is of
"bizarre" shape triggers the Shaw concern that race has supplanted other concerns in districting.14 4 Returning to the
Court's concern for legitimate decisionmaking processes, the
bizarre shape of a Congressional (or other) district distorts
community lines, and therefore affects the legitimacy of districts based on communities. 145 Stated another way, race
may be taken into account in districting only up to the point
that it becomes the dominant factor.
2. Is Race the Only Factor in Shaw?
The complex and inherently political nature of districting
makes it difficult to single out any one factor that determines
the shape of a given district. Indeed, attempting to explain a
district's shape has been compared to attempting to explain
the level of any given federal budget.146 The factors, other
than race, which led to the bizarre shape of District 12 must
be considered. It is certain that District 12 was drawn in its
present convoluted manner to protect incumbents and the
Democratic Party. 47 However, the degree to which race or
partisan politics "created" District 12 is by no means certain.
Limiting the districting to these two factors alone, it is arguable that District 12 was the manipulation of race by politics,
142. Id.
143. Traditional concerns of redistricting include seeking "to ensure effective
representation for communities of interest, to reflect the political boundaries of
existing jurisdictions, and to provide a district whose geography facilitates efficient campaigning and tolerably close connections between officeholders and

citizens." Id. at 500. See infra part IV.B.1.
144. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 501.
145. Pildes and Niemi draw an interesting analogy between Shaw and Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), which permits
"noninvidious" use of race as long as it does not become, or appear to be, the
most important value. Id. at 502.
146. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 586.
147. The General Assembly could have created a comparatively compact district in the southeastern part of North Carolina, but chose not to do so because
it would disrupt "safe" incumbent districts. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832
(1993). Justice White noted this in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 2841 n.10
(White, J., dissenting). See also Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.
1992).
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as opposed to the manipulation of politics by race, the view
adopted by the Supreme Court. 148 Applying the interpretation that race was used to political advantage, the General
Assembly of North Carolina can be seen as having used the
constraints imposed by the Justice Department under the
Voting Rights Act to create a new voting district which did
not disturb the power bases of Democratic incumbents. This
interpretation seems particularly plausible in light of the fact
that a minority district, relatively compact, could have been
1 49 The fact that
drawn in the southeastern part of the state.
such a district would have disrupted incumbents' districts
suggests that incumbency and partisan interests played a
major role in the creation of District 12. The uncertainty of
the degree to which race, incumbency, and partisan concerns
created District 12 leads to different possible interpretations
of how broadly Shaw should be applied.
3. How Narrow is Shaw?
Justice O'Connor specifically distinguished Shaw from
UJO on the basis that the plaintiffs in UJO could not have
claimed that the district was so irregular that it could only
have been understood as an effort to segregate voters by
race. 150 The Shaw decision notes that three of the Justices in
UJO found that it is permissible for a State,
employing sound districting principles such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to prevent racial
minorities from being repeatedly outvoted by creating districts that will afford fair representation to the members
of those racial groups who are sufficiently numerous and
whose residential patterns afford the opportunity of1 5creating districts in which they will be in the majority. '
Shaw therefore is, at least in one sense, very limited. A challenged district must be bizarrely-shaped, and intentionally
shaped on the basis of race. However, this does not eliminate
two other possible interpretations of how broadly Shaw could
be interpreted.
148. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 516-17.
149. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
150. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829 (1993).
151. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey (UJO), 430 U.S.
144, 168 (1977) (opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens & Rehnquist, JJ.).
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First, Shaw could be interpreted in a comparatively limited sense-as addressing only similar factual contexts. In a
limited interpretation Shaw would apply only if a State
"must justify 'highly irregular' minority districts under strict
scrutiny when-and only when-the state could have created
a reasonably compact minority district instead." 152 "Alternatively, Shaw might stand for the broader proposition that,
even when a state has no other way of creating a minority
district, it cannot resort to 'highly irregular' shapes to do so
without other compelling justifications." 5 3 The first analysis
requires only that regularly-shaped districts be chosen over
bizarre ones. The second interpretation, however, requires
an independent justification for a bizarre district, even if it is
the only option for the creation of a minority district in accordance with the Voting Rights Act. Though an open question, commentators predict that the second interpretation
will prevail. 154 In either interpretation, the question remains
what standard will be required to establish a "bizarre" district, thereby triggering judicial review.
IV.

COMPACTNESS

As A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

And that handy machine
Working very precisely
55
Removed all the stars from their tummies quite nicely. 1
McBean's machine easily added and removed stars to the
bellies of the Sneetches. The machine was used to equalize
the Sneetches, so that they could all participate in beach activities. This solution raises the question whether a district
compactness requirement could act as a "machine" which affects appearance and implements fairness in districting.
First, this section discusses a threshold issue: how bizarre
must a district be to trigger an Equal Protection claim? The
section next evaluates the role that district compactness requirements can play in answering the problem of appearance.
152. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 523.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 624. Pildes and Niemi base this opinion on the broad rhetorical
and legal terms used in the Shaw opinion. Id. This interpretation seems to
have been borne out in the Shaw remand decision and Vera v. Richards, C.A.
No. H-94-0277, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12368, at *130-32 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17,
1994).
155. DR. SEUSS, supra note 1, at 17.
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Finally, this section analyzes the different approaches cases
subsequent to Shaw have applied to compactness concerns.
A.

How Bizarre is "Bizarre"?
1.

The Role of Geography

North Carolina's District 12 is certainly not the first, nor
the only, oddly-shaped district in the United States. Shaw is,
however, the first case which recognizes a constitutional
5 6
The
claim based on the appearance of a legislative district.'
a
being
from
cross
challenge is determining when districts
"regular" shape to being "bizarre" enough to trigger a strict
scrutiny analysis. Should Justice Stewart's definition for ob1 5 v be applied to determine
scenity, "I know it when I see it,"
whether a district is bizarre or, at the other extreme, should
158
precise mathematical solutions be employed?
2.

State Solutions

Several states have attempted to prevent gerrymander59
ing by requiring compact districting.1 Some states employ
tools such as independent districting commissions and computer-automated redistricting in order to remove redistrict60
A prospective benefit of such
ing from the political process.'
a system used to redraw district lines is that race could be
156. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2845 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
157. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
158. See discussion infra part IV.C.5.
159. Bernard Grofman, Criteriafor Redistricting:A Social Science Perspective, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV.77, 85 (1985).
160. The goal of each of these approaches is to create an objective standard
for districting. However, as Pamela Karlan points out, there is no such thing as
a truly objective process. For example, persons on a commission are bound to
have political views. Karlan, supra note 26, at 253-54. Additionally, computer
programs can "create" nearly any type of district depending on what values the
programmers give greater weight to. This computer-generated approach has
been criticized as well:
The available alternatives for a districting plan are virtually endless,
and with current computer technology enabling one to "revise a boundary line and receive instant readouts of the voting behavior, racial composition, and other ...characteristics [of the] district," (footnote omitted) a contest to see who could come up with the best district would not
only be unwieldy, but unwinnable as well.
Ripley Eagles Rand, Note, The FanciedLine: Shaw v. Reno and the Chimeral
Racial Gerrymander,72 N.C. L. REV. 725, 751 (1994).
Computer technology has been held accountable for creating problematic
districts, as census data allows "nearly exact knowledge of the racial makeup of
every inhabited block of land in the state.., worthy of Orwell's Big Brother."
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included as a mandatory factor, although not the sole required factor, and still comply with Shaw.16 1 Montana, for
example, provides for a five-person commission appointed by
the minority and majority leaders of each house (fifth person
appointed by commission). 6 2 The Montana commission is
permitted to consider governmental boundaries, geographic
boundaries, communities of interest, existing district boundaries, and must attempt to stay within five percent deviation
from the ideal district population.16 3 Further, the states
which employed administrative redistricting in the 1980's
have remained unchallenged.164 In New Jersey, state legislative redistricting by a panel was not challenged. However,
congressional districting, done by the state legislature, was
1 65
challenged and ultimately struck down.
Twenty-eight states have some requirement for compact
legislative districts.16 6 Most of these states express such requirements in qualitative or "descriptive" terms. For example, the Illinois Constitution requires that districts be "com67
pact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population."
Two states, Iowa and Colorado, require specific quantitative
formulas. Iowa employs a ratio based on a comparison of the
population of the district's population center to the population of the geographic center of the district.16 Colorado requires a measurement of the perimeters of district boundaries in order to determine compactness.' 6 9 The two states
which require districting compactness based on quantitative
measures have had more litigation than those with qualitative standards, and as a result, have more compact districts
than other states.' 70 Those with quantitative standards,
Vera v. Richards, C.A. No. H-94-0277, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12368, at *4 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 17, 1994).
161. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 625.
162. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14.
163. Id. See, e.g., McBride v. Mahoney, 573 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D. Mont.
1983).
164. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 625.
165. Id. at 625-26 (citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983)).
166. Rand, supra note 160, at 754 n.244. North Carolina imposes a compactness requirement for its state legislative districts, but not its congressional districts. N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 5.
167. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a).
168. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4(4)(c) (West 1991).
169. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47.
170. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 529-30. In an extensive analysis of
compactness, Pildes and Niemi found that "redistricting bodies do not take corn-
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than states that
however, have had no more compact 17districts
1
do not legally require compactness.
The Problem of Compactness
The problem with regard to district compactness is the
lack of a consistent standard. An ongoing concern is whether
172 Indeed,
there is any such thing as a manageable standard.
Shaw and its progeny have failed to establish what "too ugly"
looks like.17 3 Because District 12 met the pre-clearance standard of the Department of Justice under the provisions of the
Voting Rights Act, yet could not pass constitutional muster,
no consistent standard for compactness has been established.
Prong one of the Gingles test,174 that a minority community
be "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constiB.

1 75
purports to
tute a majority in a single-member district,"

give a "bright-line" rule as compared to the "totality of the
circumstances" requirement of section 2. If District 12 in
Shaw could pass the compactness requirement of Gingles,
but could not withstand analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause, the result in Shaw implicitly recognizes a problem
7 6 The central challenge, therewith the Gingles standard.-

fore, is to establish a standard that distinguishes between
those districts which appear "normal enough" and those
which, by virtue of their shape, trigger a constitutional strict
scrutiny analysis.
1. Evaluating Ideals

Plato's recognition of the difference between an ideal re77 is reflected in the history of
public and a "best" republic
pactness into account any more when it is legally required, and that courts have
not been willing to enforce such requirements in ways that affect outcomes." Id.
at 531.
171. Id. at 531.
172. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
173. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem
of Racial GerrymanderingUnder the Voting Rights Act, 92 MicH. L. REV. 652,
652 (1993). See discussion infra part IV.D.
174. See discussion supra part II.B.3.
175. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
176. On Shaw's remand, Chief Judge Voorhees pointed out that if District 12
is allowed under the Voting Rights Act, virtually any district must be upheld.
Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11102, at *238-39
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 1994) (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting in part).
177. In an "ideal" republic, philosopher-kings would rule without the possibility of corruption. The "best" republic, on the other hand, recognizes that
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voting rights jurisprudence and legislation. While the Fourteenth Amendment, at least as interpreted by the current
Court, envisions a colorblind ideal, the Voting Rights Act recognizes the ongoing problems presented by race and attempts
to create the "best" solution to those problems. 178 The ideal of
a colorblind society and the protection of minorities clash di17 9
rectly in Shaw.
Even within the process of districting itself, there exists
a substantial problem of arranging values.18 0 Can the values
associated with redistricting be "ranked" in any way? The
Voting Rights Act and Equal Protection jurisprudence require that equal population and prevention of minority-vote
dilution be achieved in every district.' 8 ' Beyond these two
goals, both redistricting bodies, and reviewing courts truly
enter the "political thicket" warned of by Justice Frankfurter. 18 2 The design of any district includes many decisions
regarding the part of a town, neighborhood, or street that
should be included in a district. 1 8 3 When combined with the
fact that there is an unlimited range of districting alternatives, compromises, and deals that "create" a final plan, it is
nearly impossible to ascertain whether any one cause is determinative of a district's shape. 184 While recognition of this
infinite range of choices diminishes the hope for a standard
by which districting can be guided, the Shaw decision suggests some factors that the Court considers legitimate.
The Shaw decision expressed concern that:
[a] reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
power corrupts and that the best system of government is one which takes into
consideration the desire for power, and institutes safeguards against it See
generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. VIII, at 235-61; bk. IX, at 262-84.(Richard
W. Sterling & William C. Scott, trans., 1985).
178. Grofman, Vince Lombardi, supra note 5, at 1275.
179. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Shaw, implicitly adopts
the view that the ideal of the Fourteenth Amendment is colorblindness. Shaw
v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2829 (1993).
180. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 585.
181. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829 (quoting United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 (1976) (opinion of White, J., joined by
Stevens & Rehnquist, JJ.)).
182. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
183. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 586-87. See Vera v. Richards, C.A.
No. H-94-0277, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12368, at *104 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 1994).
184. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 586-87.
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boundaries, and who may have little in common with one
another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which the[y] live-think alike, share the
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls."8 5
In its obvious concern with race as a sole districting consideration, the Court recognized several legitimate considerations
in the redistricting process. It first implied that geographical
and political boundaries represent bases for making demarcations of voting districts. It also compiled something of a
laundry list which included such factors as age, education,
1 86
economic status, and the community in which voters live.
It is important to recognize, again, that race is not irrelevant
to the determination of voting district lines, though it may
18 7 Secondly, it appears that the
not be the dominant factor.
Supreme Court had no intention of "ranking" these values,
but simply included them all as relevant factors. However,
one distinction can be made. Geographical and political
boundaries refer to lines tied to land. Age, education, economic status, and community refer to the characteristics of
people. The Court therefore implicitly recognized both the
classification of land and people in redistricting as opposed to
adopting one view over the other. Thus, the Supreme Court
recognized the legitimacy of geographic districting in the
8
American voting system.18
Should Compactness be Used as a Standard?
Representation based on geographically defined districts
8 9 The benefits of
is central to the American political system.
such a system are based in part on communication. Historically, such benefits included the ability of a representative to
campaign and organize door-to-door, and access to common
190 The conmedia such as newspapers, radio, and television.
tinuing justification for the geographic basis of districts relies
2.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 2832.
See discussion supra part II.D.
Grofman, Vince Lombardi, supra note 5, at 1262.
Id.
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on enhanced communication between representatives and
constituents, as well as "greater voter knowledge of their representatives and of their political 'neighbors'; and greater
trust in the legitimacy of a political system in which districts
appear 'fairly' shaped-or, at least, not obviously unfairly
shaped."191 The justifications for the geographic districting
system also relate to ideas of political accountability by in1 92
creasing ties between the representative and constituents.
Representation interests are served by compact districts
193
which have some degree of common needs and interests.
This view is not without its detractors. Professor Lani
Guinier argues that territorial districting does not reflect the
group nature of political representation.19 4 She points out
that "the geographic unit is not necessarily politically homogeneous or of one mind as to who should represent it."1

95

An-

other commentator, Professor Bruce Cain, has been a proponent of the idea that traditional districting concerns are
largely outdated. He argues that technological advances
such as telephones, highways, and fax machines undermine
the rationale that there is a meaningful relationship between
1 96
compactness and effective communication.
Despite such legitimate criticism, "communication still
often takes place in group contexts, with legislators meeting
all manner of boards, committees, organizations, governmental bodies, and so on."' 97 It is equally important that
"[p]eople's lives are organized and lived in places. Where one
lives, works, shops, where one's children go to school, the
191. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 538 n.177.
192. Id. at 537.
193. Id. at 501. See also Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863
(W.D. Wis. 1992) (three-judge court) (per curiam): "The objections to bizarrelooking reapportionment maps are not aesthetic (except for those who prefer
Mondrian to Pollack)."
194. Lani Guinier, Symposium: The Electoral Process: Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting:A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEx.
L. REV. 1589, 1602-08 (1993) [hereinafter, Guinier, A Case of the Emperor's
Clothes].
195. Id. at 1606.
196. See generallyBRUCE E. CAIN,THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE (1984). Cf
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). "[Pleople, not land or trees or pastures,
vote. Modern developments and improvements in transportation and communication make rather hollow, in the mid-1960's, most claims that deviations
from population-based representation can validly be based solely on geographical considerations." Id. at 580.
197. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 538 n.177.

19941

RACE AND REDISTRICTING

means of access from place to place.., all possess a definite
territorial element." 198
Non-districted elections have been suggested as a possible solution to concerns of fair representation. One form of
such a system, proposed by Professor Guinier, is a modified
at-large voting scheme. 199 The main benefit of such a system
is that non-districted elections allow voters to align themselves with a particular viewpoint, whether it be based on
area or ideological interests. 20 0 The main drawback recognized by Voting Rights Act litigation, however, is that voters
can aggregate on the basis of race. The danger of such a system is that a minority may be denied any representation by
majority voting.2 0 ' While voting mechanisms do exist to
counteract such tendencies, it seems unlikely that Congress
or the Courts would be willing to return to a system (i.e., atlarge or multi-member districts) which closely resembles the
one which extensive litigation has fought to replace. Furthermore, there remains the strong argument that geographic
districting promotes the representation of regional needs and
2 2
interests, and exercise of political influence. 0 While accepting that compactness of districts is a desirable end may
answer one question, it raises another concerning the approach which should be taken to achieve this end.
C.

PotentialApproaches to Compactness
1.

ComparativeApproach

Jeffers v. Clinton,2 °3 an Arkansas redistricting case, held
that for the purposes of the Voting Rights Act, minority-controlled districts satisfy the compactness requirement if they
"are not materially stranger in shape than at least some of
4
the districts" in the state.20 However, this approach is not
an ideal approach. If redistricting bodies continue to contort
district lines in order to protect incumbents and party lines,
198. Polsby & Popper, supra note 173, at 678.
199. See supra note 56. See Guinier, A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, supra
note 194, for a detailed proposal of an alternative voting system.
200. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 626.
201. Id.
202. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 173 (1986) (Powell, J. concurring
and dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 623-24 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
203. 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
204. Id. at 207.
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minority districts could be distorted along with them, subjecting such districts to challenge under Shaw itself.
2. Administrative Redistricting
Use of independent districting commissions that consider
race as one mandatory concern in redistricting increases the
likelihood of complying with Shaw.2" 5 The Montana example,2 °6 in theory, appears to be workable under mandates of
the Voting Rights Act and Equal Protection standards. The
primary criticism of this approach is that there is no such
thing as an apolitical, objective standard to redistricting.2 0 7
First, panels have the potential to become political.2 °8 Second, without more, the implementation of administrative redistricting does not solve the problem of setting redistricting
standards. Therefore the administrative approach is good for
implementation in terms of cost-effectiveness, but still does
not solve the problem of the creation of judicially manageable
standards for compactness after Shaw.
3.

Cognizability

Professor Bernard Grofman offers another means by
which to measure compactness of districting. He argues that
districts should be based on cognizability, defined as the
"ability to characterize the district boundaries in a manner
that can be readily communicated to ordinary citizens of the
district in commonsense terms based on geographical referents."20 9 Such an approach would not be strictly appearancebased because it allows for natural boundaries such as coastlines or non-compact cities. 2 10 While this approach certainly
has its appeal in terms of recognition of geographic divisions,
it is limited to physical considerations, and fails to incorporate concerns such as age, education, economic status, and
2 11
other measures of "community."
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 625.
See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
Karlan, supra note 26, at 253-54.
Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 626.
Grofman, Vince Lombardi, supra note 5, at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
See discussion supra accompanying notes 186-88.

1994]

RACE AND REDISTRICTING

303

4. Qualitative Requirements
The requirement that a district be as contiguous and
compact as possible operates as an "anti-gerrymandering" device which can remove the "profit" from gerrymandering in
most cases.212 Although political map makers can still attempt to draw lines favoring a specific group when districting
requirements exist, the requirement for a maximum of compact districts "makes the game many times harder for them
to play successfully." 2 13 The problem with a qualitative ap-

proach to districting is that it only describes what a district
should look like and does not have an easily articulated standard. Such a system has the possibility of creating too much
21 4 as is eviroom for inconsistent and unpredictable decisions
denced by the continuing litigation in the area of voting
rights and redistricting.215
5.

QuantitativeRequirements

Professors Pildes and Niemi suggest that, based on the
inability of courts to define compactness consistently, quantitative measures for assessing shapes may provide the best
2 16 In attempting to
approach for determining compactness.

implement such standards, three "dimensions" which can affect the compactness of a district must be noted. Districts
could be judged, first, by how spread out they are ("dispersion"); second, by the regularity of the borders of the district
("perimeter"); or third, how the population is distributed
("distribution").21 7 The Shaw decision lends itself to an anal212. Polsby & Popper, supra note 173, at 677. This assumes the stricture of

equal population ineach district.
213. Id. at 679.
214. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 537.
215. Karlan, supra note 26, at 247.
216. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 536.
217. The measurement for dispersion entails measuring the "degree to which

a district has a central core and the extent to which all points in the district are

relatively close to that core." More simply, it is how "long" versus "wide" a district is. Id. at 549. The regularity of perimeters is concerned with how much a
district's borders "wander around in contorted ways." Districts with "fingers"
protruding from the main body of the district would have low perimeter scores.

Id. Population measures are concerned with the division of population in a
well-defined area. Id.
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ysis of District 12 with regard to the first two factors, dispersion and perimeter.2 1 8
A dispersion score is expressed as a ratio comparing the
shape of the district to that of a circle. Thus, "[a] long, narrow district, or one with 'fingers' or other extensions, is less
compact because it takes a large circle to enclose the entire
district, yet much of that circle is empty."2 19 Perimeter scores
are expressed as the "ratio of the district area to the area of a
circle with the same perimeter." 22 1 "Smooth" borders receive
higher scores because they enclose more area with less

"border.

22 1

Using Pildes and Niemi's mathematical data, District 12
has a dispersion score of .05 and a perimeter score of .01.222
The national means for such scores are .36 and .24, respectively.2 2 3 District 12 is the least compact of North Carolina's
districts according to either measurement.2 2 4 It is second
worst in the nation in terms of dispersion alone, and among
the worst in terms of perimeter alone.2 2 5 It is also the least
compact district in the nation if the two factors are added for
a single "score."2 26
These findings reveal several important points about
District 12 and redistricting in general. While District 12 is
certainly not a compact district, it does fall within a continuum of compactness measurements.2 2 7 The practical application of this fact is that the raising or lowering of the numeric
value which creates cutoff levels for "normal" versus "bizarre"
districts will strongly affect the number of districts that fall
218. The mathematical processes used to evaluate District 12 and other districts throughout the country are beyond the scope of this comment. The numbers used in this comment are therefore based on the research completed by
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at parts III and IV. For a discussion of the use of
computer technology in districting, see generally Arthur J. Anderson & William
S. Dahlstrom, Technological Gerrymandering,How Computers Can Be Used in
the Redistricting Process to Comply with Judicial Criteria, 22 URB. LAw. 59
(1990).
219. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 554.
220. Id. at 555.
221. Id. at 556.
222. Id. at 562 (Table 2).
223. Id. at 573 (Table 6).
224. "Whether it is so unique as to be considered an aberration, however,
becomes a matter of judgment." Id. at 562-63.
225. Id. at 566-67.
226. Id. at 565.
227. Id. at 567-68.
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within each category. 228 A quantitative measurement could,
therefore, subject only District 12 to constitutional review or
could, with relatively little adjustment, make many districts
subject to strict scrutiny under Shaw. A second important
point is that Shaw exemplifies the national trend of moving
away from using compactness as a factor under the redistrict22 9
In light of this trend,
ing resulting from the 1990 Census.
to require jucontinue
will
practices
redistricting
of
scope
the
forayed
has
Court
the
that
now
dicial resolution, particularly
2 30
redistricting.
of
thicket"
further into the "political
The quantitative approach has appealing aspects. Primarily, a mathematical formula ensures compact districts.
Secondly, it appears that such districts are not challenged as
23 1 However, the
frequently as traditionally created districts.
232
It does not allow
system's strength is also its weakness.
any room for geographical or political "naturally bizarre"
boundaries. In addition, adjusting the cutoff levels for "normal" versus "bizarre" districts affects the number of districts
2 3 3 Finally, a quantithat would be subject to judicial review.
tative approach may not allow room for trade-offs among the
many goals which are acceptable, and even encouraged, in
redistricting.
As an example, Pildes and Niemi's discussion of Florida's
"flagpole" district reveals many concerns that are not consid228. Id. at 568.
229. Id. at 573-74. It is interesting to note the "shoestring" district created
after Reconstruction in Mississippi. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying
text.
230. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). See also Shaw v. Hunt, No.
92-202-CIV-5-BR, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11102, at *129 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1,
1994) (arguing that a wide application of Shaw will lead to excessive federal
judicial interference in redistricting).
231. See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
232. Rand, supra note 160, at 753 n.243 (quoting RICHARD L. MORRILL,
POLITICAL REDISTRMCTING AND GEOGRAPHIC THEORY 22 (1981)).

A too simplistic application of such geographic compactness measures
is foolish, especially where the distribution of population is irregular
within districts. In many regions, the population is uneven, perhaps
strung out along roads or railroads. Travel may be easier and cheaper

in some directions than in others, such that an elongated district
astride a major transport corridor might in fact be the most compact in
the sense of minimum travel time for a representative to travel around
the district.

Id.
233. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 568.
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ered when using of a mathematical formula.234 First, this
district could be subjected to the Shaw analysis, or not, depending on what arbitrary value is set for "compact" versus
"bizarre." Second, the shape of the district is affected by the
fact that it runs along Florida's coast, causing its dispersion
factor to be unchangeably high regardless of legitimate concerns about community. A mathematical districting model
may not be able to take into account the fact the district has
the largest percentage of over-sixty-five residents of any district in the nation 2 35-certainly one measure of "community."
Although the district appears almost as non-compact as
North Carolina's District 12, one should consider the coastal
interests, age interests, and economic interests that collectively create a community of interests based on factors other
than race.
Each of the proposals discussed above has advantages
and drawbacks. The challenge is to choose which values are
most important to our political processes, and to create a
standard approach to districting from those values. Cases
following on the heels of Shaw indicate that the courts have
not yet determined the appropriate application of the standards set forth in that case.
D. Subsequent Judicial Treatment
The impact of Shaw has become immediately apparent,
as dozens of cases across the nation have incorporated its
holdings.236 Several of these cases have specifically addressed the problem of district appearances, but none have
ventured to create a standard for determining what "bizarre"
looks like. Furthermore, the remand decision of Shaw and a
Sixth Circuit case came to opposite conclusions as to whether
oddly-shaped districts met the strict scrutiny test under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Hays v. Louisiana (Hays /),237 the District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana held that Louisiana's redis234. Florida's Congressional District 22 is 100 miles long, containing the
Barrier Islands and "Gold Coast" areas. Id. at 550-51.
235. Id.

236. There were over thirty redistricting cases citing to or relying on Shaw,
in part, at the time of writing. Search of LEXIS, Mega library, Mega file (September 20, 1994).
237. 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993). The Supreme Court vacated the
judgment in this case and remanded the case to the district court in light of
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tricting plan under Act 42 of 1992, and Congressional District
2 8
4 specifically, violated the U.S. Constitution under Shaw.
The Hays I court invalidated a district which carved a sixhundred mile "Z" across Louisiana, no more than eighty feet
wide at some points. 23 9 The court rejected the defendants' arguments that District 4 had been drawn, in part, on the bases
of partisan/incumbent politics and socioeconomic commonalities, finding instead that the district had been drawn primarily for racial purposes. 24 0 The Hays I court based its holding
on the rather extreme facts before it, and the clear intent of
the legislature to provide a minority-majority district for
blacks, as opposed to an articulated standard of compactness.
In Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer,24 1 the court upheld a Maryland districting plan which
strung together two prominently black population "pockets"
with a narrow rural corridor.2 4 2 The court in Marylanders
concluded that "District 54-9's length and width comport
with an 'eyeball assessment': put simply, proposed District
54-9 appears somewhat more spread out and jagged than
so."243
most of the state plan's districts, but not significantly
It further held that the district showed due regard to criteria
other than race, such as equal population, contiguity, natural
boundaries, political subdivisions, and effective representation.2 4 4 Plaintiffs therefore met the compactness requirement of the Gingles test.2 45 The Marylanderscourt, in using
its comparative approach to compactness, did not compare
District 54-9 to North Carolina's District 12. Rather, it considered the other districts in Maryland, and made an "eyeball" assessment that it was similar to other districts, and
therefore complied with Shaw.
Louisiana's repeal of Act 42 and creation of a new voting scheme. Louisiana v.
Hays, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994). The District Court again struck down the redistricting plan as an unconstitutional gerrymander. Hays v. Louisiana, No. 921522 (W.D. La. 1994).
238. Hays v. Louisiana (Hays 1), 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1191, 1209 (W.D. La.
1993).
239. Id. at 1199-1200.
240. Id. at 1202. The court further held that the district had no commonality
of interests, such as religion and ethnicity, economic base, and geography and
topography. Id. at 1201.
241. 849 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Md. 1994).
242. Id. at 1053.
243. Id. at 1054 n.41.
244. Id. at 1056.
245. Id.
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A comparative approach to redistricting was also employed in Clark v. Calhoun City.2 46 The plaintiffs, two black
registered voters of Calhoun County, Mississippi, challenged
a redistricting plan under section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.2 47 The court held that "the proposed district in this case
is not nearly as bizarre as the district under consideration in
Shaw. We therefore need not decide whether a bizarrelyshaped district which would enable plaintiffs to state a claim
under the Equal Protection Clause would necessarily flunk
the Gingles compactness test."248 The court, therefore, remanded the case to determine whether the plan complied
with section .2.249 The Clark court managed to avoid applying
a standard for compactness by simply stating that the district
in question did not compare to that of Shaw.
The Shaw decision was comprehensively addressed on
remand to the Eastern District Court of North Carolina in
Shaw v. Hunt.2 50 The district court found that District 12
passes constitutional muster under Shaw because "it is narrowly tailored to further the state's compelling interest in
complying with the Voting Rights Act." 25 1 The court interpreted Shaw to require the "narrow tailoring" standard only
to ensure that states are not covertly pursuing forbidden
ends, not to create aesthetically-pleasing districts.2 5 2 The
on three familiar critiHunt court based this interpretation
25 3
cisms of the reasoning in Shaw.
First, the Hunt court stated that compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions have little inherent
value because the purpose of redistricting is to ensure "'fair
and effective representation for all citizens.' "254 It further
stated that no judicially manageable standard for these concerns existed. 25 5 The court finally concluded that redistrict246. 21 F.3d 92 (5th Cir. 1994).
247. Id. at 93.
248. Id. at 95-96 (citation omitted).

249. Id. at 97.
250. No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11102 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1,
1994).
251. Id. at *3.
252. Id. at *123.
253. Id.

254. Id. at *123 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748 (1973)).
255. Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11102, at
*126 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 1994)) (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149
(1986)).
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ing is within the province of state legislatures.2 5 6 Consequently, the court determined that a race-based redistricting
plan can only be invalidated if it does not give equal weight to
the votes of all individuals, dilutes group voting strength, or
does not follow districting principles that ensure that all citizens receive "'fair and effective representation.' "257
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas disagreed with the Hunt interpretation of Shaw on remand. Applying Shaw, the court in Vera v. Richards2 58 struck down a
"crazy-quilt of districts that more closely resembles a Modigliani painting than the work of public-spirited representatives."25 9 The court invalidated three districts because they
did not respect neighborhoods, communities, and political
subdivisions. 2 60 The Vera court further criticized the Hunt
court's use of contorted boundaries as prima facie evidence of
a constitutional violation, as opposed to the essence of the
claim.2 6 1 Most importantly, the Vera court stated that the
shape of the voting district is relevant even if the district is
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental
interest.2 6 2
These early cases indicate a lack of cohesion in applying
the standard for compactness as required by Shaw. This is
hardly surprising as the Shaw opinion provides no concrete
guidelines as to what constitutes a "bizarre" district. Therefore, a uniform standard is needed to both apply the principles of Shaw, and to avoid the inconsistent approaches of
Hunt and Vera.
V.

PROPOSAL

All the rest of that day, on those wild screaming beaches,
The Fix-it-Up Chappie kept fixing up Sneetches.
Off again! On again!
In again! Out again!
Through the machines they raced round and about again,
Changing their stars every minute or two.
256.
257.
258.
1994).
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at *129.
Id. at *135 (citation omitted).
C.A. No. H-94-0277, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12368 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17,
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

*5.
*8.
*94.
*131 n.55.
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They kept paying money. They kept running through
Until neither the Plain nor the Star-Bellies knew
Whether this one was that one...
or that one was this one
Or which one was what one...
2 63
or what one was

who.

The Sneetches, in a race to gain the upper hand, keep
paying money to run through McBean's machine and either
add or subtract stars, depending on which was perceived as
the superior body type. Ultimately, the state of confusion
leads the Sneetches to abandon their prejudice relating to
stars. The current litigation with regard to voting rights resembles the "in again, out again" race by the Sneetches.
However, the courts cannot effectively function as Star-Off
Machines. Furthermore, the state of confusion which ultimately helped the Sneetches will not solve the problems of
persistent litigation in the real world. On the contrary, unless a workable standard is created for voting rights legislation, Shaw is likely to add confusion rather than to resolve
districting conflicts. Further, if there is to be a meaningful
constitutional analysis of voting rights, the Court must create
rules which go beyond fact-specific controversies. States
must be able to apply the principles of Shaw. 26 4 This section
suggests a standard by which courts can incorporate the ideals of color-blind politics as envisioned by the Court in Shaw,
while recognizing the continuing values of the Voting Rights
Act.
A. District Compactness as a Solution
The Voting Rights Act requires that minorities be accorded a genuine chance to elect representatives of their
choice. Thornburg v. Gingles26 5 incorporates the "totality" requirement of section 2(b), and sets forth a three-part test to
determine whether a redistricting scheme is valid under the
Voting Rights Act.26 6 In order to prove discrimination under
section 2, a plaintiff must first prove that a minority community is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to con263. DR. SEUSS, supra note 1, at 21.
264. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 618.

265. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
266. See discussion supra part II.B.3.
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stitute a majority in a single-member district."2 67 Shaw, on
the other hand, recognizes an Equal Protection claim if a reapportionment statute, "though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of
race."268 A district compactness requirement which will satisfy the concerns of both of these legal principles is certainly
possible, and can most easily be achieved by putting a limit
on non-compactness allowed under Shaw. Such a standard
for compactness would harmonize the requirements for compactness under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and Gingles
and the Equal Protection Clause as articulated in Shaw.2 6 9
The concern with district appearances should be viewed
as an "outer constraint on extreme noncompactness." 270 Because District 12 is extremely noncompact, but within the
"spectrum" of values calculated to measure compactness, the
numerical value of District 12 itself2 71 is a good place to draw
a minimum quantitative measurement. One benefit of such a
solution would be that states could easily determine compliance with the requirements of Shaw using a uniform approach. Because "bizarre" or "compact" districts depend entirely upon where an arbitrary mathematical cutoff is drawn,
a "bright line" proposal is to simply employ the numerical
value which adds the perimeter score to the dispersion score
as the value under which no district may fall.2 7 2
A mathematical approach to redistricting would be fairly
simple to apply. By adding the perimeter and dispersion
scores, 2 73 a single score for any district in the nation could be
determined. If a hypothetical district has a score above a certain level, it satisfies the requirements for compactness under
267. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
268. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993).
269. On remand, Judge Voorhees' dissent pointed out that an assessment of
geographical compactness should not be any more problematic than the vote
dilution test articulated in Gingles. Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11102, at *277 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 1994) (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting in part).
270. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 586.
271. See discussion supra part MV.C.5.
272. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 222-26. Using the formula described by Pildes and
Niemi, the combined score for District 12 is .06, whereas the combined score of
the national mean is .60. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 58, at 562, 573. A perfect
circle would score 2.0.
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both the Voting Rights Act (Gingles prong one) and Equal
Protection (Shaw) standards. If the score is lower than that
specified number, the district has not met the requirements
for compactness.274
The use of the numerical value of District 12 would establish a low standard for compactness. Such a standard has
several benefits. First, it creates a bright line rule which districting bodies can employ without a high risk of legal challenge. It also permits wide latitude in the choice of traditional districting values, such as age, education, economic
status, and the community in which voters live. Third, a low
numerical standard allows for naturally occurring bizarre geographic and political boundaries. Fourth, a low threshold
would allow for the continued consideration of traditional,
"qualitative" districting concerns, including race. Finally, it
gives an operative standard to the Gingles requirement that
a minority community be compact enough to create a new
voting district, which would also comport with the constitutional standard. This quantitative standard does not preclude vote dilution or political gerrymandering claims in any
way.
A low quantitative standard is far from being a panacea
for the problems of extreme gerrymandering, or even a solution of the dual problems of race and redistricting. It does,
however, allow for harmonization of claims brought on the
basis of appearance and gives operative meaning to the compactness requirement of Gingles.
VI.

CONCLUSION

But McBean was quite wrong. I'm quite happy to say
That the Sneetches got really quite smart on that day,
The day they decided that Sneetches are Sneetches
And no kind of Sneetch is the best on the beaches.
That Day, all the Sneetches forgot about stars2 75
And whether they had one, or not, upon thars.
274. Such an approach would operate similarly to the mathematical rule to
determine equality of population employed in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964). Such a model would certainly comport with the desire for a "relatively
simple and judicially manageable" standard for determining compliance with
redistricting requirements. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
275. DR. SEUSS, supra note 1, at 24.
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It is unfortunate that our present legal system cannot act
as a "Star Machine" that solves racial problems as easily as
The Sneetches did. It is telling, however, that the Star
Machine itself did not solve the problems of the Sneetches-it
merely created more problems that led the Sneetches to
change. Shaw may indeed cloud the issue of race in redistricting to such a degree that the courts adopt a single, applicable standard. Shaw points out, however, that redistricting
is not, and should not be, exclusively about race.2 7 6 Redistricting should not allow people to be classified in one dimension whether it be race, age, political affiliation, or even stars
on their bellies. Shaw represents one attempt to create a
"machine" that places race in its proper role in the multitude
of redistricting considerations, but ultimately does not
succeed.
When viewed in the "tragic choice" perspective,2 7 7 Shaw
may be viewed as a recognition of values that are central to
American government. The tragic choice paradigm states
that when a society is forced to deal with several fundamental values which come in conflict, policymakers might accommodate certain values up to a point, but stop short of following them to their logical conclusion as a way of signaling
respect for countervailing values.2 78 This approach inevitably preserves the tension between values. Shaw reflects a
tension between the desire to maintain voting districts which
are based on concepts of community and the desire of the Voting Rights Act to ensure fair representation for minorities.
This comment argues that in order for Shaw to be implemented in a manner which considers the dual purposes of
compactness and race, a quantitative standard should be created. This standard should be relatively low and disallow
those districts which are drawn to protect minorities only if
they have a compactness value lower than that of Shaw. This
will allow for traditional districting considerations while creating a manageable judicial standard for compactness. It will
also create a standard for the Gingles requirement of compact
276. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
277. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978)
278. Id. Professors Calabresi and Bobbitt recognize this solution as one of
many possible solutions to value conflict. A society may also decisively choose
one value over another, recognize that the conflict is inevitable, or choose alternately between values.
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minorities in redistricting under the Voting Rights Act which
is harmonized with Equal Protection standards. Such a solution should prevent the creation of "snakes" while recognizing
the concerns about appearance as illustrated in The
Sneetches.
Mark Inbody
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2

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Section 2 (1965):
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color.
Law of Aug. 6, 1965, Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110, § 1, 79 Stat. 437, (1965).
Section 2 (1982):
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in
section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if,
based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that
the political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected
by subdivision (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205,
§ 1, 96 Stat. 131, (1982).
Section 5:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect
to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) based
upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 4(b) are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
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practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from
that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a
State or political subdivision with respect to which the
prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) based upon determinations made under the second sentence of section 4(b)
are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from
that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, or whenever a
State or political subdivision with respect to which the
prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) based upon determinations made under the third sentence of section 4(b) are
in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting different from that in
force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), and unless and until the
court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the
right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided,
That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if
the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or
other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to
the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not
interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission,
the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that
such objection will not be made. Neither an affirmative
indication by the Attorney General that no objection will
be made, nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor
a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall
bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indicates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day
period following receipt of a submission, the Attorney
General may reserve the right to reexamine the submis-
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sion if additional information comes to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day period which would
otherwise require objection in accordance with this section. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the
provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States
Code and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
Pub. L. No. 94-73, title II, §§ 204, 206, title IV, § 405, Aug. 6,
1975, 89 Stat. 402, 405.

